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Challenges to Integrating UAS into the NAS
• What’s the impact on  current traffic in the NAS  
– Encounter rates and geometries?  
– How would UAS interact with existing traffic, i.e. VFR.
• Surveillance requirements?
• Alerting requirements?
• Maneuver guidance?
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How Our Research Capabilities Tie Together
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UAS-NAS integration 
concepts
ACES: Flight plan and NAS-agent 
modeling system
17 UAS types
UAS models,
comm. link models19 UAS mission profiles DAA algorithms
New UAS-related modeling and simulation capabilities
DAA sensor models
Traffic displays, DAA algorithms, ATC, Ground Control Station
Human-in-the-Loop and Flight Test Evaluation
NAS-wide Simulation
Surveillance Requirements
(ACES Simulation)
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• Research Objective:
– Analyze the performance of updated sensor (ADS-B, TCAS, and radar) range and 
fields of regard requirements and sensitivities against Draft MOPS Alerting 
requirements
– Assess airborne radar intruder detection frequency against realistic NAS traffic 
(IFR, cooperative VFR, and non-cooperative VFR) to inform radar tracker 
requirements
• Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
– 5-nm range appears to cover 99% of potential warning alerts DAA system would 
encounter with non-cooperative VFR, providing verification that 5-nm declaration 
range for airborne radar is suitable 
– When UAS had at least one non-cooperative VFR intruder in its field of regard, 
there were 3 or fewer non-cooperative aircraft 98% of the time
Non-Cooperative Sensor Surveillance Requirements for DAA MOPS
Integrated Human-in-the-loop Experiment (Test 1)
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• Research Objective:
– Evaluate air traffic controller acceptability of UAS maneuvers in response to 
detect-and-avoid advisories
– Evaluate pilot performance for remaining Well Clear
• Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations
– Controllers reported maneuvers requested between 60 and 90 seconds until 
closest point of approach were acceptable, and at 120 seconds were 
unacceptable.
– Controllers judged that requested maneuvers were frequently too large
• indicates a difference between the separation standard controllers use for 
manned aircraft and that used by UAS pilots to remain Well Clear.
ATC Interoperability Requirements for DAA MOPS
Integrated Human-in-the-loop Experiment (Test 2)
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• Research Objective:
– Evaluate the pilot’s ability to remain well clear as a function of:
• detect-and-avoid display features 
• whether the display was stand-alone or integrated within the main traffic 
display
• Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations
– Of all advanced maneuver guidance tested, maneuver recommendations 
(Autoresolver) were the most effective in aiding the pilots to remain well clear
– Most losses of Well Clear can be prevented given an alert lead time of at least 60 
seconds prior to closest point of approach.  This is not always possible when non-
cooperative aircraft are involved, due to the short range at which they can be 
detected.
Alerting and Guidance Requirements for DAA MOPS
DAA Self-Separation Alerting Methods, Performance, and 
Robustness Study (ACES Simulation) 
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• Research Objective:
– Gather data to support development of alerting logic, methods, and performance 
requirements using cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic and the SC-228 
definition of Well Clear, considering target level of safety and NAS-interoperability
• Interim Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations
– DAA Warning Alerts that actually resulted in a loss of well clear providedat least 15 
seconds of lead time to LOWC in 83% of cases
– 72% of DAA Warning alerts resulted in a loss of well clear.  This suggests that  
alerting criteria is within suitable performance bounds
– Even though a large proportion of false alerts were observed, most of the 
encounters fall near the well clear boundary.   Trading these false alerts for 
minimizing missed alerts seemed acceptable 
– Also, given the low frequency of DAA alerts (about 1 every 10 flight hours), these 
large proportion of false alerts is considered minimal
Self-Separation Alerting Requirements for DAA MOPS
Upcoming: Flight Test 4
Objectives:
1. Validate DAA requirements in stressing cases that drive MOPS requirements
– High-speed intruder ( > 500 knots )
– Low-speed intruder ( ~ 100 knots )
2. Validate collision avoidance/DAA alerting and guidance interoperability 
concept in the presence of realistic sensor, tracking and navigational errors
3. Validate well clear recovery guidance when well clear is lost in the presence 
of realistic sensor, tracking and navigation errors
4. Validate DAA alerting and guidance requirements under normal 
circumstances in the presence of realistic sensor, tracking and navigational 
errors
Key verification and validation activity for RTCA SC-228
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Definition of Success and Evaluation Criteria
• Objective 2: Validate TCAS/DAA alerting and guidance interoperability concept in the presence of realistic 
sensor, tracking and navigational errors: (e) level-level TCAS RA encounters (mitigated TCAS RA maneuver, 
>10kft)
• Success Criteria:
– A timely (corrective initially) DAA alert is provided to the UAS pilot
• ‘Time of DAA corrective alert’ is assessed to be reasonable and timely by the test engineer.
– A corrective TCAS RA is generated for the primary intruder and the UAS pilot complies with TCAS RA guidance
• Test engineer observes UAS pilot receipt of, and compliance with, TCAS RA for primary intruder.
– Data collected: LVC log file, SAAProc log files, TCAS log files for ownship and intruder, SAAP file
• Evaluation Criteria:
– UAS pilot receives DAA corrective alert with associated guidance
• First ‘time of DAA corrective alert’ coincides (within TBD s) with (‘yellow band guidance’ on UA’s current heading AND altitude) AND 
(horizontal ANDOR altitude ‘green band guidance’ indicating viable UA maneuvers to remain well clear): derived from alert and 
guidance time histories in JADEM csv file
– Vertical DAA guidance indicates no viable vertical maneuvers in temporal proximity to TCAS RA
• ‘Red band guidance’ displayed for all altitudes for DAA vertical guidance from TBD s prior to initial ‘ time of corrective TCAS RA’ until 
expiration ‘time of corrective TCAS RA’.
– DAA alerting and guidance for the primary intruder are removed while a TCAS RA is present for the primary intruder
– UAS pilot promptly evaluates (and complies with) TCAS RA guidance and avoids NMAC.
• ‘Ikhana maneuver time’ is within TBD s of initial ‘time of corrective TCAS RA’
• ‘commanded/observed maneuver’ consistent with sense of  TCAS RA (‘climb’ or ‘descent’)
• No ‘NMAC’ recorded in analysis of DGPS truth data
– DAA alert(s) and guidance are removed once the ownship is clear of threat
• DAA alert status ‘none’ at some point after CPA and remaining ‘none’ until test termination
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FT4 TEST OBJECTIVES – SSIWest.2.e
Objective 2: Validate TCAS/DAA alerting and guidance interoperability concept in the 
presence of realistic sensor, tracking and navigational errors: (e) level-level TCAS RA 
encounters (mitigated, >10kft).
MOPS Sections 2.2.4.2.4 Alerti  
2.2.4.3 Determine Processing,  
Collision Avoidance Interopera
Configuration System Under Test: 
Display:VSCS
Contributing Sensors:
Test Objectives (TO) 1. Validate DAA alert timing allows pilot sufficient time to assess options and maneuver to remain well clear.
2. Validate DAA guidance to UAS pilot is appropriate (reasonable, timely & responsive).
3. Validate DAA alerting and guidance do not interfere with UAS pilot’s ability to assess and follow TCAS RA guidance.
Success Criteria
(retest if criteria not 
met)
1. A timely (corrective initially) DAA alert is provided to the UAS pilot. 
2. A corrective TCAS RA is generated for the primary intruder and the UAS pilot complies with TCAS RA guidance.
3. Data collected: LVC log file, SAAProc log files, TCAS log files for ownship and intruder, SAAP file (‘raw’ surveillance data). 
Test Method • MANUEVER: Pilot disregards DAA guidance and follows TCAS guidance if consistent with test constraints.
• Aircraft speeds (non-accelerating): Ownship 150 KGS, Intruder 150/180/210 KGS
• Encounter Length: 1 min (IP to CPA)
• Stable Conditions: stable at the IP (1 minutes prior to CPA)
• Test Termination Criteria: targets diverging, range > 0.75 nmi., no DAA alerts displayed.
• Climb/Roll/Pitch Rates: Ownship 0/0/0, Intruder -2500 FPM/0/0
• Tolerance: ± 8 sec, ± 5 kts at IP crossing.
Omnibands
Lateral Offset = 0.5 NM
TCAS Alerting Boundary = 0.80 NM
Minimum Altitude  Offset: 300 ft
TCAS ADS-B Radar Tracker
YES (S) YES YES YES
300 ft
0o Relative Ownship
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Summary of SSI-Ames FT4 Scenarios 
• 72 Total Scenarios Planned:
– Objective 1: 18 
– Objective 2: 29 
– Objective 3: 9 
– Objective 4: 16 
• 2 Flights, 41 (57%) Scenarios Completed 
– Objective 1: 6 (4/29)
– Objective 2: 12 (4/26) + 16 (4/29)
– Objective 3: 3 (4/29)
– Objective 4: 4 (4/26) 
• 2 Planned Flights Remaining
• 1 Additional SC-228/Ames Flight Remaining
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Questions?
Confesor Santiago
NASA Ames Research Center
confesor.santiago@nasa.gov
Karen Cate
NASA Ames Research Center
Karen.t.cate@nasa.gov
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